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This article seeks to explain the increase in the German Green party votes in 2019 European elections 
through the East-West cleavage. Using the 2018 German General Social Survey data, it identifies and 
compares the Green Party electorate in both regions in terms of conventional and supposed determinants of 
Green voting. Results of the multivariate analysis equally support both models, indicating left-wing voters as 
the main source of the Greens’ electoral gains across Germany. However, while in the East the Greens were 
supported primarily by the electorate of the Social Democratic party dissatisfied with the activity of this party, 
Western Germans exhibited a trend of left-leaning voters’ backlash against the rise of the radical right party 
Alternative for Germany through Green voting. This realignment is explicated by the persistent specifics of 













One of the chief intrigues of the 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections, 
particularly in Germany, was the populist radical right forces’ degree of success (Koerner 
2018). However, contrary to the alarming forecasts, German electorate generated another, 
perhaps far more surprising output. It elevated the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The 
Greens) to the position of the second most popular party with around one-fifth of the total 
votes, which is almost twice the party’s result at the previous European elections – 20.5 vs 
10.7 per cent of votes (Federal Returning Officer’s Federal Statistical Office 2019).  
The performance of the “tree-huggers” and “eco-nerds” (Lehmann 2019) who had 
been consistently perceived as a mere one-issue party throughout their not so long intra-
parliamentary history (Blühdorn 2009, 36-40) nudged the expert community to develop new 
ex post explanatory models to fit the renewed, green reality. Many analysts came up with a 
structural explanation of the Green electoral phenomenon that could be defined in terms of 
the crisis and decline of Angela Merkel’s mode of consensual and grand coalition politics 
targeting the alleged “median voter” (Brattberg 2019; Holtz-Bacha 2019; Poguntke 2019). 
Theoretically, such an approach, which primarily considers political opportunity structure – 
characteristics of parties and party competition – is defined as a supply-side explanation (for 
more see: Brunsbach, Stefanie, and Werner 2012; Kitschelt 1986). The impact of the citizens’ 
frustration and the overall loss of agency and authenticity by the German left-wing parties, 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the first place, has been specifically 
accentuated (see Pfister 2019).  
An evident shortcoming of such an approach is its inability to distinguish the set of 
individual traits that could prompt support for the Green party. In turn, the available scope 
of scholarly literature devoted to the demand-side explanation (concerned with sociocultural 
factors of voting, i.e. aspirations and grievances of citizens) comprises profound quantitative 
explanations of the Green parties’ electoral results either within the context of cross-national 
comparisons or the German case exclusively (see: Schumacher 2014; Rüdig 2012; Dolezal 
2010). Nevertheless, studies of the German Green party have systematically paid negligible 
attention to the established decades-long contrast in the Green party electoral performance 
in old and new (i.e. Western and Eastern) federal states of Germany.1 This contrast has once 
                                                          
1 Throughout the work, the notion of Western Germany (Western German states) refers to the 10 federal states 
(Länder), which have constituted the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) since its very foundation in 1949. In 
turn, Eastern Germany (Eastern German states) designates five states of the former socialist German 
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again manifested itself in the last European election but has so far attracted only marginal 
academic coverage (see: Franz, Fratzscher, and Kritikos 2019).2 
Hence, the unprecedented allocation of votes for the Green party in the May 2019 
European elections, reflecting the presence of the metamorphic shifts in the German political 
parties’ support, remains insufficiently and inadequately elucidated. Therefore, it serves as a 
research puzzle, which this article seeks to unravel, especially given the voters’ realignment 
trends having been unfolding since the 2017 Bundestag elections and reflected in the opinion 
polls and regional elections’ results.3  
Furthermore, the absence of multi-faceted research explaining electoral performance 
of the German Greens in the 2019 EP elections in a cross-regional perspective, i.e. focusing 
on the patterns of the party votes’ distribution along the East-West fault line, contributes to 
the academic relevance of the present article. With respect to this, the research question of 
this article is: What demand-side factors did influence the regional distribution of the Green party votes in 
the 2019 European election? 
In turn, to accomplish this goal, we need to address the widely accepted treatment of 
the European elections as second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). In practical terms, 
second-order elections literature contends and empirically demonstrates that since those 
elections (local or European ones) do not determine the composition of the national 
government, citizens are less concerned and conscious about them, which entails a lower 
turnout, protest vote and a higher percentage of votes for minor parties (Carrubba and 
Timpone 2008). Nonetheless, we argue that the research object of this article – preferences of 
German voters before the 2019 European election, which are the closest proxy to illuminate the 
voting results and their distribution across Germany – possesses several attributes of 
relevance representing a valid piece of empirical data. Furthermore, the outcome of that 
European election serves as a suitable departure point for the research inquiry in the given 
framework, since results of our study account not solely for the particular election’s outcome 
but point out more fundamental shifts in the German voters’ realignment in terms of the 
party-voters ties. 
                                                          
Democratic Republic (GDR), which existed from 1949 until 1990 and which became a part of the FRG in 
1990. The full list of Eastern and Western states’ names can be found in Appendix 1. 
2 In Western Germany, the Greens improved their results by an average of 10%, whereas in Eastern Germany 
corresponding figures account for nearly 5% (See Appendix 1). 
3 Generally speaking, it refers to the fall of popularity of the German catch-all Volkspartei (people’s parties) – 
Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) – whose voters have been leaking primarily to 
the Greens and populist radical right “Alternative for Germany” (AfD).  
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The following arguments could be cited in support of this claim. The turnout in the 
2019 European elections in Germany rose substantially in comparison to the elections of 
2014 – 61% versus 48%. That contrast stands out, as the turnout figures for Germany have 
been fluctuating around 45% since the 1999 European election. If one adds a structural factor 
of the previously mentioned ongoing reconfiguration of a balance of power between national 
political parties, it serves together as a strong evidence supporting a suggested thesis. It could 
be aggravated by the aforementioned emergence of the populist radical right AfD on the 
German political stage after the 2017 legislative election that may have pushed many 
moderate voters to the electoral mobilization against this party perceived as a threat to the 
political mainstream. Finally, minor challenger parties, such as the German Greens, have 
been considered the ones most capable of earning political capital on European elections 
and of subsequently transmitting it to the national level (Rüdig 2019; Schulte-Cloos 2018).4 
What is more, party votes’ geographical distribution in the 2019 European elections 
relative to the several federal states coincides largely with the respective results of October 
2018 state (Landtag) elections in Hesse, Bavaria, as well as those in Bremen (Western 
Germany) in May 2019 and autumn 2019 elections in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia 
(Eastern Germany). Above all, it applies to the high results of the Greens in the former three 
elections and their moderate performance in the latter three cases.5 Two propositions may 
be brought out from the described peculiarity – that the 2019 European election results 
reflect not a spontaneous but a fundamental shift in the German voters’ preferences and that 
the East-West regional difference in Green voting is a persistent phenomenon. 
Insofar as the given spatial distribution of the Green party votes relative to the East-
West divide represents a worthy research puzzle, the goal of this article is to explain region-
specific drivers of the Greens’ electoral support augmentation in the 2019 European election 
using the demand-side explanation. In this, we rely on the assumption that the regional cleavage 
between Eastern and Western Germany has affected patterns of party-voters alignment 
(Abedi 2017), which in turn influenced the research focus of our work – factors determining 
Green voting in both regions. For the sake of achieving the stated goal, demand-side 
determinants of Green voting in Germany, divided into conventional and newly derived 
                                                          
4 In contrast to the mixed-member proportional representation electoral system used for Bundestag and 
regional elections, the European elections in Germany operate within the framework of the variation of the 
open lists proportional system known as panachage. 
5 The Greens’ results in the 2019 European election in the given states (state elections’ results given in 
parentheses): Hesse – 23.4% (19.8%), Bavaria – 19.1% (17.6%), Bremen – 22.7% (17.4%), Brandenburg – 
12.3% (10.8%), Saxony – 10.3% (8.6%), Thuringia – 8.6% (5.2%) (Federal Returning Officer’s Federal 
Statistical Office 2019). 
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ones, will be examined using a multivariate OLS regression analysis of two separate regional 
samples and region-specific interaction effects within models of the general population. 
Based on the obtained results, inferences regarding the East-West divergence in terms of the 
factors fueling the Green’s support will be drawn.  
The overall structure of the article takes the form of four sections along with a 
conclusion. The first two sections are concerned with a literature review on the description 
of the Green party voting clientele, articulating conventional determinants of the Greens' 
support and those drawn from the new theoretical propositions. The third section proceeds 
with an empirical analysis of formulated assumptions on the selected database, followed by 
the interpretation of discovered patterns. In the last section we link our empirical results with 
the theoretical strands of the article. Finally, the conclusion gives a brief summary of the 
findings and discusses their value for further research in the area of regional party-voters 
realignment in the FRG. 
Conventional predictors of the Green voting in Germany 
East-West divide: “Separated in spirit, united in heart” 
As regards Germany, the term ‘regional cleavage’ is used to point out the cultural 
differences that arose in a country after the 1989 reunification of the capitalist FRG and a 
socialist block member GDR. It is claimed that although the wall in Berlin – serving as a 
symbol of the separation of not only the German people but also the whole world – fell 
down, a ‘Wall in mind’ of Germans stayed in place (Hepburn and Hough 2012, 74). This 
metaphor denotes the situation, in which no material barriers between two artificially 
separated parts of the one nation were left, but the impact of 40 years of living under different 
political and economic systems started to manifest itself. In general, it has pertained to 
cultural differentiation embodied in a formation of the idiosyncratic Eastern identity rooted 
in the rejection of the outcomes of unification (Trotzidentität), nostalgic feeling about certain 
aspects of living in the GDR (Ostalgie) as well as the unacceptance of western liberal values 
(Staab 1998). 
Obviously, such divergence had long-term implications for the patterns of electoral 
behavior (see: Rohrschneider 2015). Concerning the Greens, the greater portion of votes 
obtained by the party in Western states is not ipso facto something out of the ordinary. 
Electoral history of the Greens has been accompanied with a disproportionally stronger 
performance in the Western states of the Federal Republic (Rüdig 2012, 110-12). Multiple 
studies agree that this feature is related to the political essence of the Greens as a niche party 
for a particular audience, most of whom reside in West Germany (Poguntke 1998; Markovits 
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and Silvia 1997, 115-18). Collectively, they outline a critical role of a dissonance between the 
dominant Western and Eastern German values, due to the separate history of the two states 
and the prolonged implications of that divide (ibid; Milder and Jarausch 2015, 4-5, 20). In 
particular, the origin of the Green party from the Western German mass movements of the 
1960s and 1970s has provided a sense of continuity of the existence of Greens, as well as the 
perception of a party as a natural part of the national political stage (Poguntke 1992, 348-50). 
Likewise, an entire generation of Germans was introduced to the Greens’ image, values and 
personalities (Rüdig 2012, 114-17). Those factors have been completely absent in the Eastern 
states.  
In turn, many dwellers of the former GDR possess a specific nostalgic memory and 
amiable attitudes towards the ideals of the “Old” Left (privileged position of the proletariat, 
big state, etc.), affected by life under socialist rule or having been brought up by the people 
who lived under socialism (Markovits and Silvia 1997, 120-23). This historically contingent 
feature contributes to the understanding of the Easterners’ propensity to favor the socialist 
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, an heir of the GDR ruling party – SED) and its 
successor – The Left (Die Linke). Moreover, it is argued that value orientations of people 
living in post-socialist states are hardly compatible with the ideas of the New Left, rooted in 
the post-material values transmitted by the Greens (ibid). Built on this argument, it is possible 
to articulate the first – baseline - hypothesis of our research: 
-  H1: If an individual lives in Western Germany, the probability of voting for the Greens is higher. 
Sociodemographic profile 
From the outset, the bundle of nearly inalienable sociodemographic features of the 
German Green Party adherents’ profile could be trailed through the whole volume of studies 
on the topic. The paradigmatic constituents of the Green electorate are females, highly 
educated people and urban dwellers with above average incomes and secular views, being 
represented by new middle-class members, students and public sector employees as well as 
those engaged in socio-cultural professions (Frankland 2019; Schumacher 2014, 313-15; 
Dolezal 2010, 542-48). With regard to age categories, the largest portions of Green 
supporters tend to be found among members of the so-called ‘new social movements’ (NSM) 
generation6 (aged 60-74), people of upper-middle age (45-60), and the youngest (aged 18-24) 
                                                          
6 The concept of the ‘new social movements’ generation embraces the most active participants of the New Left 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s, accordingly (Fogt 1982 and Mohr 1992 as cited in Rüdig 2012, 115). If 
sticking to the common generational classification, those people partially fall into the cohort of the ‘baby-
boomers’ generation, but since the notion of the NSM generation bears a specific sociopolitical imprint relevant 
to the European Green movements it will be utilized in our analysis instead. 
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cohort of an enfranchised population (Dolezal 2007, 3-11; Bürklin and Dalton 1994; Rüdig 
2012, 115-17). 
Theoretical groundings behind such a composition maintain that the location of an 
individual at the intersection of the listed groups makes a person much more susceptible to 
the post-material challenges of the postindustrial society (Dalton 2013; Inglehart 2008), 
which involve, apart from an appealing and urgent issue of ecology, tendencies of personal 
empowerment and emancipative equality (Poguntke 1992, 348-50). Albeit, some groups, 
especially women, could vote Green because of their left economic stances as well (Rüdig 
2012, 115). The above description of a median Green voter is also backed by the 
overrepresentation of the foregoing categories among the virtual voters of the party in a 
number of the preceding elections (ibid, 113-22). The totality of the aforementioned 
characteristics, for the sake of parsimony, is reduced to four hypotheses about the 
sociodemographic profile of the Green party supporters: 
- H2.1: If an individual belongs to the female gender, the higher the probability of voting for the Greens. 
- H2.2: The higher personal educational level, the higher the probability of voting for the Greens. 
- H2.3: If an individual is a middle-class member or student, the higher the probability of voting for 
the Greens.  
- H2.4: If an individual belongs to the youngest cohort of population or the ones aged between 45 and 
60 or the NSM generation (only for Western Germany), the higher the probability of voting for the 
Greens. 
Values and political attitudes 
The core trait that stretches the profile of the average Green voter beyond the 
boundaries of classic class and secular-religious cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) 
culminates in the party’s early motto: “we are neither left nor right but green” (Milder and 
Jarausch 2015, 6). The paramount premise that has made such political positioning possible 
is the “silent revolution” of the 1960s-1970s and its effects described by Ronald Inglehart, 
which entailed a cardinal shift of values from the material (survival) to the post-material (self-
empowerment and emancipation) ones in the minds of Western Europeans (Inglehart 2015). 
Today, the Green party has shifted towards the ideological center, notwithstanding retaining 
its authentic “left-libertarian ‘rainbow catch-all’ position” (Grant and Tilley 2019, 508-9) that 
implies demands for the rights of various minorities and multiculturalism (Kitschelt 1988; 
Blühdorn 2009, 45-49). Similarly, strong pro-European orientations of the Greens and 
advocacy of pro-immigration policies could be ascribed to the cosmopolitanism of the 
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Greens’ sympathizers (Dolezal 2010, 542-48; Bomberg 2002, 33-36; Patton 2018, 64). Hence, 
the next two hypothesis of the present article could be formulated as follows: 
- H3.1: The higher the level of post-material values absorbance by individual, the higher the 
probability of voting for the Greens. 
- H3.2: If an individual internalized left-libertarian issue attitudes towards issues of migration and 
the European Union, the higher the probability of voting for the Greens.  
Controls: Economic voting 
The Greens have been recognized to constitute a genuine part of the left side of the 
German parties’ political spectrum with respect to the economic dimension (Markovits and 
Silvia 1997, 123-28). What is more, the ideological justification of the party’s egalitarian 
policies goes beyond mere socialist redistributive justice, advocated by The Left and its 
moderate social democratic counterparts (ibid). The Greens have contested the paternalistic 
nature of a classic welfare state, natural to its classical social-democratic comprehension. 
Instead, party ideology puts forward an idea of an emancipative social state based on the 
principle of participatory justice (Teilhabegerechtigkeit) (Blühdorn 2009, 44-45), substituting 
direct financial transfers to the worse-off with investments in the provision of equal 
opportunities for the disadvantaged (ibid).  
Nevertheless, practically, egalitarian economic considerations are considered to have 
no influence on the Greens electoral results (Williams, Stegmaier, and Debus 2017). There 
are several justifications for that. One puts an emphasis on the underclass’ proclivity to vote 
for more tangible welfare promises of the populist left, exacerbated with the Greens’ cultural 
progressiveness depicted above and not shared, as a rule, by the lower stratum (Dolezal 2007, 
23), as reflected in Lipset’s notion of “working-class authoritarianism” (Lipset 1959). Besides, 
many Germans simply do not treat social justice as a single-issue party (i.e. Greens) zone of 
competence and responsibility (Blühdorn 2009, 42-43). Finally, most Germans have not yet 
forgotten that the left-wing SPD-Green coalition in the early 2000s adopted an essentially 
neoliberal Agenda 2010 alongside with Hartz IV legislation, which severely cut welfare 
benefits (Nachtwey and Spier 2007, 136-142). Furthermore, the overall trend of decreasing 
electoral salience of the economic dimension on par with other valence issues has pervaded 
German party politics in the last decade (Franzmann, Giebler, and Poguntke 2020, 4-6). It 
has attributed greater importance to the socio-cultural dimension of party competition and 
caused a greater polarization of voters on the respective issue positions (e.g. migration) (ibid). 
Consequently, in our analysis, we will not hypothesize the potential effects of 
economic motivations for Green voting, especially, given the insights from studies that 
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exhibit weak regionalist differences in patterns of economic voting (see for example Daoust 
and Dassonneville 2018 on the case of Canada and Quebec). Yet, we will employ several 
indicators to control for both valence (personal perceptions about the state of national 
economy) and position economic voting (individual egalitarian welfare orientations) (for 
more see Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Foucault 2013).  
New tendencies: the drift of the traditional left parties’ voters and a 
backlash of cosmopolitan citizens  
In the introductory section, several accounts explaining a rocketing growth of the 
Greens in the 2019 European elections with the accommodation of the demands of the 
frustrated left voters have been cited. Indeed, the party-voters’ alignment in the left segment 
of the German electoral market has suffered a dramatic erosion. Largely, it has been 
attributed to the German left-wing party actors, with the SPD experiencing an existential 
crisis and struggling to come up with a new identity, strategy and policy proposals (Dostal 
2017a, 236-239) and The Left being unable to go beyond its niche electorate of the “Old” 
Left preferences (Patton 2018, 60-63). To elaborate on the issue of the left-wing voters’ 
realignment in favor of the Greens, we have to identify three possible mechanisms of that 
process. 
The first one, logically continuing the beginning of this paragraph, tied with the 
realignment of the left-leaning citizens, who have been consistent voters of traditional left-
wing parties: SPD and The Left. Another mechanism is centered not only on the leftist 
parties’ electorate, but involves voters whose leftist stances are defined in cultural terms as 
opposed to the classic left economic egalitarianism. In this context, the increasing 
attractiveness of the Greens for cosmopolitan Germans resonates with a model proposed by 
Bischof and Wagner (2019), which reflects a backlash of culturally progressive citizens 
against the emergence of the populist radical right agenda and forces on the political scene. 
In the described model, the authors focus on and prove the short-term voters’ polarization, 
defined as a situation when “ideological views become more distant from the political center” 
(ibid, 2), produced by the radical right party entrance in the parliament (ibid, 5-13). This 
polarization effect has been acknowledged to occur among German citizens following the 
2017 populist radical right AfD entrance in the Bundestag (Franzmann, Giebler, Poguntke 
2020, 22). Consequently, we conjecture that in the next nationwide election – the 2019 
European election – the Green Party had turned into an optimal voting option for 
cosmopolitan left-leaning Germans, wishing to empower essentially the only force that 
explicitly opposes the xenophobic stances of the AfD (ibid).  
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science                    Vol 45 (June 2020) 
40 
 
Finally, some speak about a deterioration of the culturally progressive people’s trust 
into the orthodox federal politics in general (Poguntke 2019). It is assumed to be motivated 
by some citizens’ beliefs that in spite of their choice at the polling station, the elected officials 
from centrist parties will nonetheless sacrifice their promises to reach another encompassing 
compromise (ibid). That logic, combined with the postulates of second-order elections 
theory, would explain the increased portions of Greens’ votes by the sort of an anti-
establishment voting of progressive citizens. However, the latter scenario is rather marginal 
for our work, thus its effects will not be hypothesized. Instead, we will control for the 
potential voters’ frustration with the ruling coalition that may have fueled the Greens’ 
electoral rise by utilizing measurement of individuals’ trust in government.  
In turn, the first narrative of the drift of traditional left parties’ voters could be 
evidently gauged empirically by the presence of people with social democratic and The Left 
party identification among the Greens’ voters. Another possible indicator is employment in 
the service sector (the so-called grey collars) or being a member of the ‘precariat’ class (e.g. 
being self-employed), since these social milieus have served the niche electorate of left parties 
for years (Dostal 2017a, 233-235). Especially, it refers to the social democrats after their U-
turn in social policies in the early 2000s, undertaken to cater to the preferences of middle-
class voters (Nachtwey and Spier 2007, 136-140). Other core voting clientele of traditional 
left parties – manual laborers (blue-collars) and the unemployed are not treated as potential 
voters of the Greens due to the abundantly discussed discrepancy in cultural values between 
“welfare chauvinist” (Mewes and Mau 2012), “authoritarian working class” (Lipset 1959), 
and the inclusive libertarian Greens. Yet, it is expedient to use trade union membership as a 
proxy indicator of the affiliation to the “Old Left” parties voting clientele, since it is strongly 
correlated with the traditional lower-class membership. With respect to the left-wing voters’ 
backlash mechanism, one possible and widely used metric is the individual self-placement on 
the left-right ideological scale. Notwithstanding its drawbacks, such as the limited capacity 
of people to locate their stances on the left-right spectrum correctly, its advantage for our 
study lies in its ability to grasp the voters’ polarization. It is achieved by allowing people to 
decide for themselves what is politically right or left, irrespective of specific issue-positons, 
thereby exhibiting their self-perceived distance from ideological center (Bischof and Wagner 
2019, 5). Furthermore, the effects of this general indicator will be subsequently related to the 
values of markers responsible for grasping the H3.1 and H3.2 that test the impact of specific 
progressive and libertarian issue positions of individuals on Green voting. 
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Accordingly, the last two major hypotheses are of utmost interest in our article and 
posed with respect to the two aforementioned scenario of German left-wing voters’ 
realignment – the drift of the traditional left wing parties’ adherents and the electoral backlash 
of culturally libertarian leftist citizens: 
- H4.1: If an individual is a traditional supporter of the SPD or The Left, the higher the probability 
of voting for the Greens. 
- H4.2: The more to the left-wing on the political spectrum a person places him or herself, the higher 
the probability of voting for the Greens.  
Multivariate regression analysis of the Green voting determinants  
Data and Method 
Evaluation of the determinants fostering the Green voting in the 2019 European 
elections requires a comprehensive opinion surveys’ data array, dated no earlier than 2018. 
Our study utilizes an opinion poll data of the 2018 German General Social Survey 
(ALLBUS)7 (GESIS 2019). Such a choice is justified with the high degree of sample 
representativeness; it comprises 3477 observations and diverse topical modules devoted to 
personal, attitudinal and behavioral information. Questionnaire surveys for the 2018 edition 
were conducted from April until September with randomly sampled individuals aged 18 and 
older. The minor drawback of the dataset pertains to the impossibility to measure 
exhaustively the relevance of some of the hypotheses formulated earlier, above all the 
economic attitudes and position towards the EU, because it lacks conventional items 
estimating relation to the level of taxation and the European integration, respectively. 
Nonetheless, the questionnaire contains other items that serve as appropriate substitutes for 
the estimation of those attitudes.  
The dependent variable of empirical analysis is represented by the respondent’s 
answer to the question asking to estimate his or her probability of voting for the Greens in 
the national election, measured from 0 (‘very unlikely’) to 10 (‘most likely’). As well, it 
includes options to indicate non-acquaintance with a party at all (0.6%) and one’s uncertainty 
about the answer (about 2.3%). Such a choice of the dependent variable, rather than a 
conventional discrete-choice one, is dictated by the possibility of more meaningful statistical 
analysis of preference for a small party by separating measurement of electoral utility from 
party choice (Van der Eijk et al. 2006). For example, a recent study of the AfD supporter 
base also uses this type of DV for almost the same reasons (see Goerres, Spies and Kumlin 
                                                          
7 German abbreviation standing for Die Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften. 
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2018). In turn, the operationalization of independent variables is presented in the Appendix 
2.  
As a basic methodological approach, given the numerical dependent variable and the 
wide range of predictors, the article employs a regression analysis consisting of OLS 
regression. After the approbation of the initial hypothesis regarding the presence of a 
statistically significant East-West difference in the Greens’ support, Eastern and Western 
samples will be extracted from the general population for separate examination. For this step, 
we need to use standardized regression coefficients to be able to compare the magnitude of 
estimated effects in both regions. In order to obtain standardized values of both – estimated 
coefficients and standard errors – we will not simply standardize the resulting beta 
coefficients, but rescale all variables by subtracting their means and dividing them by standard 
deviation prior to model fitting. Subsequently, to investigate region-specific effects, we will 
test the same sets of independent variables on the general population using interaction terms 
with a specific region.  
Results and Interpretation 
Multivariate analysis’ results are rendered in a way to present general findings 
concerning the hypotheses elaborated on the general population and Eastern and Western 
samples successively. At first, we are to verify the basic hypothesis about the higher 
probability of citizens’ residing in Western Germany for the Green voting. 
Table 1 clearly shows that people living in Western German states are by far more 
prone to vote for the Green party than the easterners are, which is reflected in the values of 
coefficients of the corresponding variables slightly exceeding one and staying robust when 
controlling for other socio-demographic features. Hence, the baseline hypothesis of the 
research about the existence of a significant discrepancy in the Green voting patterns is 
statistically confirmed (H1). However, the coefficient of determination (R2) value for the 
first model is negligibly small (slightly exceeding 0.05); therefore, the variable of a 
geographical residence per se is not sufficient to explain the variance in the propensity of 
Germans to the Green voting. As a next step, Eastern and Western German samples relative 
to the residence of interviewees are retrieved, independent variables are grouped in four 
models (controls, conventional determinants, the inflow of the left-wing voters, aggregate 
model) and analysis is replicated for each sample respectively. 
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Table 1. OLS regression output on the dependence between individual’s West Germany 
residence and propensity to vote for the Greens. 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Cells entries are non-standardized regression 
coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). 
Source: Author from ALLBUS 2018 (Baumann, Schulz, and Thiesen 2019). 
Table 2 displays a markedly increased share of the explained DV’s variance, both for 
conventional and newly conceived predictors of Green voting and aggregated models, 
proving a substantial explanatory capacity of the constructed models. However, prior to the 
interpretation of the inferred results, regional level regression models have to be 
complemented with the results of analysis conducted on general population that includes 
regional interaction effects. Because of the bulkiness and a small number of significant 
interaction terms, regression output is presented in Appendix 4. Thereby, below we provide 
only the visualization of all statistically significant marginal effects of the East and West 
German regions on the delineated determinants of Green voting.   
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Observations 3,293 3,265 3,265
R
2 0.055 0.097 0.146
Adjusted R
2 - 0.094 0.143
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Table 2. OLS regression output on respondent’s propensity to vote for the Greens. 
 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Cells entries are standardized regression coefficients 
and standard errors (in parentheses); for models 2, 3, 4, 7 robust standard errors are used 
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and put in parentheses. The number of observations varies depending on a model because 
some respondents did not or could not provide answers to certain questions. 
Source: Author from ALLBUS 2018 (Baumann, Schulz, and Thiesen 2019). 
Once all necessary statistical operations have been carried out, we may turn to the 
stepwise interpretation of the results with respect to the posed hypotheses. Combined 
insights from Table 2 and Figure 1 report a number of discrepancies in relation to the 
traditional sociodemographic profile of the Greens’ supporters described in the literature. It 
could be inferred that the only sociodemographic hypothesis that finds statistical 
confirmation for both regional samples is the well-educated people’s probability to vote 
Green (H2.2). In turn, hypotheses about a higher propensity of women (H2.1) to Green 
voting turn out to be a significant determinant of Green voting among Western Germans 
solely. The hypothesis tied with an influence of middle-class members and students’ 
affiliation on the Greens’ support (H2.3) has been partially proven, i.e. specifically for the 
white-collar occupational group and only for the Western sample. In the same vein, the age 
hypothesis (H2.4) appears to be partly confirmed, since in the East the youngest enfranchised 
cohort revealed some positive trends to Green voting that, nevertheless, were not proven 
after the addition of interaction terms in the model. Meanwhile, in the West the estimated 
effect of people of the upper-age category (45-60) to vote for the Greens was not only 
discovered as a reliable predictor but was amplified when combined with the interaction 
terms of residence in West Germany. In addition, the affiliation with the NSM generation 
remained an insignificant factor. 
Turning to other conventional determinates of the Green voting, the hypothesis 
about the high level of post-material values’ absorption of Green voters (H3.1) is confirmed 
exhaustively for the Western subset. For East German dwellers, the level of an individual’s 
post-materialism has not been found to have an impact on the likelihood of Green voting. 
Conventional accounts would have justified this phenomenon by the overall lesser level of 
post-materialist values’ acceptance in the East, however, descriptive statistics of the 
respective variable in the ALLBUS dataset show only a marginal gap between post-material 
values absorption for both regions.8 Contrary to this, the left-libertarian attitudes of the 
Greens’ sympathizers explained the strong positive relation with the propensity of Green 
voting remaining highly significant for both regions (H3.2).  
                                                          
8 See Appendix 5. 
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 A more regionally distinct picture arises when contemplating covariates that 
constitute the model designed to grasp the drift of the traditional left voters to the Green 
party. To mention a few similarities, these are the strong positive correlation of trust to 
federal government and Green voting, signaling that the Greens’ electoral rise was facilitated 
not by people driven by anti-establishment sentiments but rather by those who prefer 
conservative solutions within the existing political configuration. In addition, union 
membership stayed insignificant throughout all models, while The Left party identification 
was negatively associated with Green voting. This fact points out that the traditional working 
class, whose members are both more inclined to join unions and vote for a quasi-socialistic 
The Left (Dalton and Jou 2010, 40-41), were by no means a key social group that contributed 
to the Greens’ vote augmentation in either part of Germany. 
However, interaction models revealed that in each part of Germany there has been a 
unique occupational milieu that is rarely found amid coherent Green followers 
conventionally but exhibits higher-than-average propensity for Green voting. For Eastern 
German states, these are self-employed individuals, displaying one of the highest positive 
coefficients and marginal effects in the East Germany models (see Appendix 4 and Figure 
2). What is more, the indicator of the SPD party identification was proved significant 
specifically for East Germany, even though the size of the estimated marginal effect is 
relatively moderate, proving the corresponding hypothesis (H4.1). As for the Western states, 
it was detected that grey collars represent an occupational group, members of which are 
prone to vote Green to an even greater extent than white collars – one of the core 
professional support groups of the party (Figure 3). Besides, as opposed to the East, in the 
West there is a significant negative marginal effect of the SPD party identification on the 
variable of our interest. Finally, Figure 4 reflects one of the most important tendencies 
discovered, pertaining to the generally more leftist ideological positions of Greens’ potential 
voters in the West (H4.2) and more moderate stances of those residing in East Germany.9 




                                                          
9 Similar inference could be derived from another visualization of this relationship for both regions, based on 
the model without interaction effects (available in Appendix 6).  
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Figure 1. The marginal effect of respondents’ female gender, middle age group, white-collar 
occupational status on the probability of voting for the Greens: West Germany. 
         
c)   
Note: Hereinafter black dots indicate values of the unstandardized beta-coefficients, while 
“whispers” above and below dots indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. The marginal effect of respondents’ SPD party identification and self-employed 
occupational status on the probability of voting for the Greens: East Germany. 
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Figure 3. The marginal effect of respondents’ SPD party identification and grey collar 
occupational status on the probability of voting for the Greens: West Germany.  
               
Figure. 4. The marginal effect of respondents’ ideological self-placement (0 – far left, 10 – 
far right) on the probability of voting for the Greens. 
         
Apart from all the above, several notes have to be made concerning the behavior of 
control of the economic variables. The main effects of the indicator that were supposed to 
control for economic voting as a valence issue – the evaluation of the national economic 
situation – appears significant in several models when combined with determinants of the 
new potential leftist electorate. An identical situation is observed for another indicator, used 
to account for left-wing welfare preferences – primary value of social protection as a goal of 
governmental policies. The former always has a negative value, whereas the latter contains 
positive ones, meaning the correlation of the positive evaluation of a state of national 
economy and a higher degree of disagreement with the priority of social protection with the 
Green voting probability. Thus, one may infer that, on the one hand, no clear economic 
motives for voting of the conventional Greens’ electorate are deciphered and, on the other 
hand, the new left-wing electorate of the party seems to be satisfied with the economic 
performance and not with the internalization of the traditional leftist economic agenda. Yet, 
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we hasten to note it is merely a conjecture, arisen as a sub-product of our analysis, and which 
demands a separate inquiry for a full-fledged empirical verification. 
Discussion 
Having summarized the multivariate analyses’ outcomes and provided a brief 
interpretation thereof, it is necessary to take a step back to our theoretical grounds and the 
broader context of German left-wing voters’ realignment. Through the assessment of 
conventional theoretical accounts of the Greens’ electorate, it was disclosed that the 
conventional profile of the Greens' ‘average voter’ that could be found in the multiple works 
is mixed. Taken together with the fact that the Greens’ vote share in the May 2019 elections 
grew considerably, these two observations suggest that the party has attracted a significant 
portion of the electorate, whose traits and/or attitudes somewhat differ from the ones 
intrinsic to the niche electorate of the Greens. The most demonstrative indicator of this 
provision pertains to the occupational background of the Greens’ electorate, among which 
the self-employed (in East Germany) and grey collar (in West Germany) elements emerged.  
Overall, it has been brought out that both Eastern and Western augmentation of the 
Greens’ votes were provided at the expense of traditional left voters. Similar to the niche 
voting clientele of the Greens, represented by the middle-class members, they also 
predominantly share left-libertarian value orientation. However, interaction models 
demonstrate that segments of the leftist voters that secured the electoral rise of the Greens 
in the 2019 EP election differed in the two parts of Germany. In the case of East Germany, 
the adherents of SPD coupled with the self-employed citizens exposed the highest propensity 
to support the Greens. Importantly, they generally share more moderate leftist positions than 
the average Green voters, which, taken together with the insignificance of post-material 
values absorption as a predictor of Green voting in East Germany, points out the rather 
materialist considerations-driven character of voting for the Greens.  
Amid possible reasons for this one could cite vastly divergent normative value 
orientations of the two core social milieus of social democrats’ electorate – the educated 
middle-class and manual laborers. The former has been by far more liberal culturally, 
compared to the rather conservative and authoritarian laborers (Dostal 2017a, 236-238). This 
first became salient when the migrant crisis broke out and the populist radical right AfD split 
SPD’s vulnerable support coalition around the issue of refugees (Patton 2018, 56-58). Thus, 
many blue collars, attached to the SPD and The Left switched to voting for AfD in the 2017 
federal elections despite the AfD’s market economic stances (Adorf 2018). In turn, 
cosmopolitan middle-class adherents of SPD were dissatisfied with the insufficiency of their 
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party’s actions to safeguard the refugees’ asylum rights (Dostal 2017b, 591-95). Subsequently, 
both groups’ dissatisfaction with the social democrats continued to deepen, aggravated by 
another compromise based grand coalition agreement of the ruling CDU/CSU with the SPD 
in March 2018. Described patterns were particularly salient in East Germany, which became 
an electoral stronghold of the AfD due to its massive support among the working class. In 
turn, the findings of our empirical research illustrate that another part of the social 
democrats’ electorate – the left-leaning precariat – have experienced palpable realignment 
trends and started to gravitate towards the Green party. 
Turning to West Germany, as our findings indicate, there has been not just an 
absence of the relationship between an individual’s party identification with the SPD or The 
Left, but also a significant negative dependency. Nonetheless, what our analysis reveals is a 
significantly more leftist ideological self-assessment of an average Green voter in Western 
states. Coupled with the discovered link between grey collars occupational affiliation, 
members who constitute a tangible part of the German labor market, and Green voting, it 
essentially signifies that Greens to a certain extent unintentionally became a catch-all party 
for the culturally cosmopolitan voters in West Germany. Our empirical analysis provides 
some conjectures that they were barely driven by economic considerations while presenting 
strong evidence of their left-libertarian attitudes, which supports the claim that their 
ideological self-placement refers, above all, to the cultural or so called GAL-TAN dimension 
(Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002).10 Combined with the positive dependence between the 
level of one’s trust in government and Green voting, we may conclude that our analysis offer 
reliable evidence for the mechanism of cosmopolitan voters’ backlash that boosted Greens’ 
electoral performance.  
Notably, no effect of The Left voters’ leakage to the Greens was disclosed, although 
the party witnessed electoral losses in the 2019 European elections as well.11 One explanation 
of that, extensively discussed in the literature, could be The Left core electorate’s siphoning-
off to the AfD, especially in Eastern Germany. The arguments to support this claim include 
the presence of a substantial overlap in parties’ core voting clientele – the industrial working 
class and unemployed, pronounced anti-establishment populist elements in their ideology 
and claims for the reputation of the East German interests’ tribune (Olsen 2018; Adorf 
                                                          
10 Green/Alternative/Libertarian – Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist: conceptualization of the 
sociocultural axis of party competition. 
11 Average vote losses of The Left account for 7.16% in the East and 1.15% in the West (Federal Returning 
Officer’s Federal Statistical Office 2019). 
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2018). Withal, the prevalence of culturally exclusionist sentiments among The Left electorate 
could have restricted its members to consider the Greens as a promising voting option (ibid).  
At last, to put our findings in a broader context, the average acceptance of the Green 
party among people of different political preferences in both regions of Germany will be 
demonstrated. For both regional samples we visualize mean values of our main dependent 
variable – self-estimated probability of respondents’ voting for the Greens – among people 
with certain party identification (narrowed only to the six major parties) as well as those 
without any party ID.  
Figure 5. Visualization of the regional mean group probability of Green voting with respect 
to the respondents’ party ID. 
 
Note: The dashed red line marks the value of Green voting probability equal to five.  
Source: Author from ALLBUS 2018 (Baumann, Schulz, and Thiesen 2019). 
Figure 5 depicts a graph suggesting that the most likely voters of the Greens are 
obviously those who identify themselves with this party. The same way one may observe that 
the next biggest mean group probabilities of Green voting are found among the SPD and 
The Left adherents. One remarkable feature of the Eastern sample is that mean probabilities 
for both traditional left-wing parties’ devotees fall between the values of “4” and “5” (out of 
10), while in the West, they exceed “5”, which makes Green voting generally more likely than 
unlikely. Furthermore, the Western sample is distinguished with the conservative parties’ 
mean probabilities, excluding that of the AfD, which is vastly closer to the threshold value 
of “5” than the respective values in the Eastern sample.  
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Hence, the data laid out in the above graphs enable us to speculate about a higher 
degree of the Green party’s acceptance among Westerners, compared to the Eastern states, 
where Greens have remained to a certain extent a marginal element of local politics. That 
observation particularly echoes the description of the new left-wing electorate of Greens 
discovered previously. In the East, it is a rather narrow group of SPD devotees and a self-
employed precariat, while in the West these are employees of a core segment of the post-
industrial economy – the service sector – with by far more leftist orientations. Coupled with 
the presence of a more numerous and faithful niche electorate of the Green party in Western 
states, it completes the picture behind a dramatic difference in the Greens’ vote augmentation 
in the 2019 European election in both regions of Germany.  
Conclusion 
This article was set out to investigate reasons behind the spatial difference in the 
German Green Party upsurge in the 2019 European elections to demonstrate manifestations 
of the East-West regional cleavage with respect to the modes of party-voters alignment. 
Preliminarily grounded in scrutinizing the 2019 European elections’ outcomes in the given 
framework, this research proceeded with laying out the theoretical hypotheses, derived from 
two branches of literature. First, the hypotheses on the geographical disproportionality of 
the Green Party support, as well as the sociodemographic profile, value orientations and 
political attitudes of the electorate of the German Green party were drawn from a 
comparative review of scholarly literature. Another set of hypotheses on the left-wing voters’ 
realignment was retrieved from recent analytic accounts concerned with German electorate 
behavior in the aftermath of the 2017 Bundestag election and literature on radical right 
parties’ influence on voters’ polarization.  
Multivariate regression analyses reported that the assumption of a higher likelihood 
of Green voting in Western Germany was confirmed but could hardly explain a tangible part 
of its variation. Meanwhile, hypotheses on the bundle of traits of a traditional 
sociodemographic profile of the Greens’ adherents were proven fractionally and only for the 
Western sample. These results point out that the Greens adherents’ profile experienced 
several alterations. In terms of political and value attitudes, they emerged as generally reliable 
predictors, with a notable absence of relationship between the level of individual’s post-
material reflections and Green voting propensity among Easterners. Given that, a 
supplementary explanation, intertwined with the effects of the left-wing voters’ realignment, 
was proving reliable to account for the electoral rise of Greens.  
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Essentially, this marks the major finding of this article, explaining that despite the 
growth of Greens’ results in East and West German states, the nature of this support was 
not identical. Accordingly, two hypotheses were formulated about mechanisms of left-wing 
voters’ realignment – the drift of the traditional left parties’ voters and the backlash of left-
libertarian citizens embodied in electoral support of the most ardent anti-populist force, i.e. 
the Greens. Empirically, we brought out that the former mechanism accounts for the Greens’ 
support patterns in the East, where former SPD adherents and occupationally self-employed 
citizens of moderate left-views have exhibited the highest propensity to support the Greens 
among the unconventional sectors of the Greens’ electorate. As for the Western states, the 
second mechanism appears to suit realignment trends there, since a higher level of Green 
voting probability was associated with far more leftist ideological self-placement of citizens, 
post-material and libertarian values’ absorption as well as with strong trust in government. 
Besides, service sector employees were found extremely likely to vote Green, reflected in the 
fact that the estimated effects of the white-collars’ likelihood to Green voting, who are 
considered a traditional voting clientele of Greens, were markedly lower than the respective 
values for grey-collars. The relative weight of that occupational cohort in the contemporary 
German labor market, and the fact that it has never displayed sympathies towards the Green 
party earlier reinforce our conclusions about tectonic shifts in German party-voters’ 
alignment. Remarkably, none of the foregoing tendencies affected The Left Party electorate, 
owing to its voting clientele cultural orientations’ incompatibility with the cosmopolitanism 
shared by the Greens’ supporters. By the same token, analyses revealed no relationship 
between an individual’s egalitarian economic stances and proclivity to Greens’ support. 
Finally, we found a generally greater level of acceptance of the Greens among Westerners 
and its rather marginal role in the Eastern states. 
Thus, the research aim of this article has been accomplished, because evidence 
reflecting different mechanisms of German voters’ realignment towards Greens in the East 
and West were found as well as their dependence of the persisting specifics of German 
regional politics. Firstly, there is a divergence in the nature of national political parties’ ties 
with the electorate in the Western and Eastern states and a lesser level of party partisanship 
among Easterners. Also, the prolonged contrast in value orientations between dwellers of 
the old and new federal states, above all relating to materialism-post-materialism collision, 
still has implications for electoral patterns.  
The article acknowledges its limitations, since the influence of the German regional 
cleavage on electoral outcomes is investigated solely in the case of one party in a particular 
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election. Our research does not predict that the peculiar voters’ alignment manifested in the 
2019 European elections will last onwards. Rather, the discovered patterns may serve as a 
solid foundation for further investigation in the area of German East-West regional 
differences effects on the spatial realignment of German voters, by, for example, applying it 
to the AfD electoral results distribution. Regarding studies of the German Greens, our 
research concentrates chiefly on the demand side explanation of the Greens electoral 
performance, only partially accounting for the exogenous factors, hence, applying supply side 
theories, for instance differences in the agenda promoted by the Greens in East and West 
Germany, are expected to be seminal for further inquiry. 
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